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There is a pressing need for a better understanding of how access to various types of 
financial products can impact retirement behavior, especially if this access comes from a 
change in the incentive scheme through a reform of the current Social Security system. 
This is especially important if we are to provide useful policy recommendations 
regarding reform to the current social insurance system. In this paper I focus on the 
“annuity puzzle,” the question as to why the annuity market is so narrow. I present a 
model that endogenizes the annuity decision along with the consumption/saving and 
labor supply decisions. This research enhances our understanding of how annuities work 
in a life cycle model with more realistic characterizations of the choices and incentives 
that individuals face. My results show that the low rates of annuitization can be the 
product of optimal decision making by individuals in a life cycle model which 
endogenizes the labor/leisure decision and accounts for Social Security. The government 
should pay particular attention to the rules regarding withdrawal of benefits through 
annuities or lump-sums when introducing individual retirement accounts or other 
privatization schemes, given the interaction between retirement incentives and the 
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 1 Introduction
There is a pressing need for a better understanding of how access to various types of ﬁnancial retirement
products can impact retirement behavior, especially if this access comes from a change in the incentive
scheme through reforms of the current Social Security system. A body of new research is tackling some of
these issues, but more attention needs to be given to solving some of the puzzles that the access to some of
these ﬁnancial instruments already represents, even in the absence of a widespread endorsement from public
institutions. This is especially important if we are to provide useful policy recommendations regarding
reform to the current social insurance system.1
In order to contribute to the objectives described above, this paper presents a dynamic model of the joint
labor/leisure, consumption/saving and annuity decisions over the life cycle. I introduce several models of
the life cycle decision making of the individual, in increasing level of complexity and closeness to reality,
in order to provide a framework of policy analysis for considering important policy experiments related
to the reforms of Social Security. I introduce in this consumption/saving and labor/leisure framework the
possibility of endogenously choose annuities under capital uncertainty and in the presence of Social Security
and bequest motives. The model provides new insights regarding the “annuity puzzle” and the effects of
social insurance on labor supply and wealth accumulation.
I begin the analysis with a simple model, which ignores, for almost all purposes, the individual’s labor
supply decision. In this model, consumption and saving over the life of the individuals are analyzed in detail.
Modigliani and Brumberg (1954, 1980), Friedman (1957), Beckmann (1959), Phelps (1962), and Ando and
Modigliani (1963) represent seminal contributions to the analysis of this classic problem in economics.
Phelps presents an inﬁnite horizon model of the consumption/saving decision under investment uncer-
tainty (providing the framework for the model that I solve ﬁrst), and he derives closed-form solutions for
several models with varying assumptions regarding the utility function. Hakansson (1970) provides a re-
ﬁnement and extension of Phelps’ work, allowing for a choice among risky investment opportunities and the
possibility to borrow and lend.2
I ﬁrst present a ﬁnite horizon version of the simplest model and report closed-form solutions for the con-
sumption decision rule. I then solve this model numerically with two objectives in mind: ﬁrst, to validate
1 A number of the reforms in other countries have been done before some of the details of the system where fully understood
and their implications for individual behavior studied. For instance, in Chile, the system is facing the challenge resulting from low
participation rates, relatively high reliance on a minimum pension offered by the government, and potentially early retirement rates
which make problematic to maintain even a small minimum pension level.
2 Levhari and Srinivasan (1969) re-examine Phelp’s model and include a dynamic portfolio choice. Merton (1969) generalizes
Phelps’s model to the continuous time case and also allows for a portfolio selection decision. Samuelson (1969) analyzes the
lifetime portfolio selection problem in discrete time. Fama (1970), assuming “perfect markets,” shows that a two-period model
provides most of the insights of the multi-period model of consumption decisions.
1the techniques that will be used exclusively in the more realistic model which introduces labor supply, annu-
ities, and Social Security; and second, to determine whether an accurate characterization of the ﬁnite horizon
problem is as difﬁcult to obtain as it is for the inﬁnite horizon case. Rust (1999a) discusses the complica-
tions involved in attempting to replicate Phelps’ (1962) solutions using numerical dynamic programming.3
The unboundedness of the utility functions used complicates the numerical approach, and even when using
the most sophisticated techniques under the assumption of logarithmic utility, the problem remains quite
challenging.
The numerical approach for the ﬁnite horizon case is fairly well behaved. Even in the absence of the
bequest motive, the numerical solution approximates the closed form solution quite well, using either the
logarithmic utility function or the CRRA utility function. I show both analytically and numerically that the
ﬁnite horizon solution of the consumption/saving problem with bequests converges to the inﬁnite horizon
model (without bequests). I also show simulated solution paths for consumption and wealth accumulation.
Modiﬁed versions of this benchmark model of the consumption/saving decision have been used ex-
tensively in the literature with different objectives. Hubbard and Judd (1987) provide a partial and general
equilibrium discussion of the importance of social insurance in a model with uncertainty and borrowing con-
straints. Thurow (1969) invokes credit market restrictions to reconcile the prediction of the life cycle model
with the empirical evidence, in particular with the fact that consumption tracks income quite closely in the
data. Zeldes (1989a) and Deaton (1991) study the role of liquidity constraints using extensions of this model
in a ﬁnite and inﬁnite horizon framework, respectively. Beckmann (1959) presents a dynamic programming
model that introduces income uncertainty (but with no labor decision), Sandmo (1970) explores the role
of income and capital uncertainty in a two period consumption/saving model, and Miller (1974) presents
the inﬁnite horizon version of such a model concentrating on income uncertainty, ﬁnding that agents would
always consume less when income is stochastic. Nagatani (1972) also introduces income uncertainty to
justify the close relationship between consumption and income in the data, and Zeldes (1989b) solves a sim-
ilar model using numerical techniques, since closed-form solutions are unavailable when using a constant
relative risk aversion utility function.
Skinner (1988) explores the importance of precautionary savings in a model with risky income, approxi-
mating the optimal consumption path via Taylor expansions. Carroll (1997) presents a theory of buffer-stock
saving where individuals maintain contingency funds to hedge against income uncertainty. Some empirical
evidence presented by Carroll (1994) and Carroll and Samwick (1997) seems to support certain implications
of this theory. Hubbard et al. (1994, 1995) analyze and solve with numerical techniques, a multi-period
3 See also Ben´ ıtez-Silva, Hall, Hitsch, Pauletto, and Rust (2000) for a discussion of this issue and a comparison of numerical
methods for solving a wide range of problems in economics.
2model of the consumption decision with uncertain lifetimes, and stochastic wages and medical expenses.
They emphasize the importance of precautionary savings and the role of social insurance. Attanasio and
Weber (1995), Attanasio and Browning (1995), and Attanasio et al. (1997) highlight the importance of con-
sidering the effects of changes in demographics and labor supply behavior in a life cycle model if we are to
match the empirical evidence. However, they still model labor supply as exogenous. More recently Gour-
inchas and Parker (1999) have estimated the consumption/saving model using simulation techniques, and
Cagetti (1999) has focused on wealth accumulation. Dynan et al. (1999) explore saving behavior across
income groups, Banks et al. (1998) analyze income and expenditure patterns around the time of retirement,
Engen et al. (1999) study the adequacy of household saving in a model with uncertain lifetime and income
uncertainty, Palumbo (1999) highlights the importance of taking into account uncertain medical expenses
to explain the slow rates of dissaving among the elderly, and Cifuentes (1999) uses the consumption/saving
model to discuss the effects of Pension reform.4
None of these models considers explicitly the labor supply decision of the individual, and thus, our work
can be considered an attempt to complement and extend those models by considering labor decisions as in-
deed endogenous to the life cycle consumption/saving problem. However, this is not acompletely novel con-
sideration, Heckman (1974), Heckman and MaCurdy (1980), MaCurdy (1981, 1983), Bodie and Samuelson
(1989), Bodie, Merton and Samuelson (1992), Low (1998, 1999), Flod´ en (1998), and French (2000) tackle
this issue in theoretical and/or empirical contexts, but our models attempt to incorporate realism by consid-
ering additional sources of uncertainty, introducing annuities and Social Security, and providing a general
framework which allows for policy experimentation.
More recently, an increasing number of papers have incorporated the labor decision in general equilib-
rium models of the economy in their analysis of the effects of Social Security reform. Huggett and Ventura
(1998), B¨ utler (1998), ˙ Imrohoroˇ glu et al. (1994, 1999a, 1999b), and De Nardi et al. (1999) are just a few
examples. However, since they do not focus on individual decision-making, and because the general equi-
librium approach requires a number of strong assumptions to make the problem solvable, there are many
aspects of the life cycle model still to be addressed.
At the heart of our work is the allowance of agents to make their labor/leisure decision along with their
consumption/saving decision in a utility maximizing framework in ﬁnite horizon. Individuals can work
full-time, part-time, or not at all at any point during their life, and they can consume continuously subject
to a budget constraint (they can not borrow against future income). They can also accumulate wealth over
their life at an uncertain rate of return which I model as draws from a log-normal distribution. Following
4 Browning and Lusardi (1996) present an comprehensive survey of the consumption/saving literature and focus on saving
behavior. See also Deaton (1992) for an illuminating presentation of consumption models.
3our piecemeal approach to solving these models, I ﬁrst introduce wages as deterministic; that is, agents
know their exact proﬁle of wages from day one. This effectively maintains the value function as dependent
only on wealth, making the model a fairly simple extension of the consumption/saving model. I consider
an isoelastic and Cobb-Douglas utility function on consumption and leisure, and given the unavailability
of closed-form solutions when the marginal utility is non-linear, I solve the problem numerically by back-
ward induction using dynamic programming techniques. I will assume throughout most of the analysis
that the constant relative risk aversion parameter is larger than one, effectively implying that consumption
and leisure are substitutes.5 I also have to parameterize the within-period valuation of consumption versus
leisure, a parameter that has an important effect on the labor supply decisions, as will become clear from our
discussion in the following sections. I show that this model already captures paths of consumption, labor,
and wealth accumulation, consistent with the literature and empirical regularities.
Next I introduce labor income uncertainty, allowing for the wages to be stochastic. I start by character-
izing the wage realizations as independent and identically distributed draws from a log-normal distribution,
with a mean at each point in time that matches both the deterministic proﬁle considered previously and a
standard deviation consistent with research on the variability of income. This new source of uncertainty in-
creases the computational burden of solving the model by a single order of magnitude, since now the value
function also depends on the uncertain draws of wages. The numerical techniques used can still handle
the problem, but computing time increases as the “curse of dimensionality” makes its appearance. I then
allow for serial correlation in the wages following the empirical evidence on the topic. I solve models with
different serial correlation factors and compare the results to those of the previous models. I then simulate
the solutions with certain starting values of the state variables and average out the simulations to compute a
path for consumption, labor, and wealth accumulation over the life cycle.
I then tackle the problem of introducing annuities and a Social Security system to this framework.6 The
strategy is to ﬁrst introduce in the consumption/saving model with bequests the possibility of partial or total
annuitization by individuals and then extend the model and introduce endogenous labor and Social Security.
Agents endogenously decide to annuitize at any point of their lives part or all of their wealth; that is, they
can purchase a sure income stream for the remainder of their lives at a price which takes into account the
average age speciﬁc mortality probabilities in the population.7 The cost of the annuity cannot exceed current
wealth in the period that they annuitize, and the decision to annuitize is unique and non-reversible. This last
5 See the discussion in Heckman (1974) and Low (1998).
6 Rust (1999b) presents a survey of models that try to incorporate uncertainty and insurance mechanisms in models of social
insurance.
7 The literature refers to this type of annuity as single premium immediate life annuity.
4assumption effectively means that they can only annuitize once in their life.8 I do not, however, force them
to do so at a given age or stage of their lives.9
To solve this model I have to take into account that agents are choosing the optimal time to annuitize
and the size of the annuity along with their consumption/saving decision, forcing us to carry the annuity
value as another state variable of the problem. This is an important exercise because I introduce this kind
of insurance in the simplest possible stochastic model of lifetime decision making and show that agents do
react to the availability of this insurance.
I then extend this model to consider the labor/leisure decision as endogenous and introduce Social Se-
curity. The full model provides important insights into the classic and important question of whether social
schemes affect the behavior of individuals, and this model of endogenous annuities provides some insights
into the “annuity puzzle,” the question as to why the annuity market is so narrow.
Our results suggest that the low rates of annuitization can be the product of optimal decision making
by individuals in a life cycle model which endogenizes the labor/leisure decision and accounts for Social
Security. This important result is consistent with the conclusions of Bodie and Samuelson (1989), and
Bodie, Merton and Samuelson (1992). They all emphasize the role of labor supply ﬂexibility in making
risky investments more attractive.10 In this paper I ﬁnd that the counterpart of that result is that life annuities
are a less attractive investment once the more complete model that endogenizes labor supply decisions is
considered.
The policy implication of these ﬁndings are that the government should pay special attention to the rules
for withdrawing balances from individual retirement account and other similar types of privatized ﬁnancial
instruments since the interactions between labor supply, retirement, and annuity decisions can lead to a large
proportion of the population opting for lump-sum withdrawals. The model presented here can be used a ﬁrst
step in understanding some of the effects of a variety of rules that these privatized systems will have to take
into account.
In the next section I solve analytically and numerically the ﬁnite horizon version of the consump-
tion/saving benchmark model and simulate its implied consumption and wealth accumulation paths. Section
3 introduces the endogenous labor/leisure model, presents its numerical solution, and provides a discussion
of its results. In section 4, I extend the life cycle models of consumption/saving and labor/leisure decisions
to allow for endogenous annuitization and the presence of Social Security. Section 5 summarizes the main
results and discusses extensions currently being considered and implemented.
8 This is a fairly realistic assumption, as emphasized in TIAA-CREF (1999).
9 This model complements and extends the framework introduced in Friedman and Warshawsky (1990).
10 In a recent paper Ben´ ıtez-Silva (2003) has empirically tested this theoretical prediction and found that that individuals with
labor supply ﬂexibility hold up to 14% more wealth in stocks.
52 The Consumption/Saving Model
In this section I solve a ﬁnite horizon version of the consumption/saving problem analyzed in Phelps





















where b is the discount factor, which for simpliﬁcation in the derivations includes the mortality probabilities
(later on these mortality probabilities will be considered separately in the solution and simulation of the
model), c represents consumption, and w is wealth at the beginning of the period. Savings accumulate at an





￿ . Utility depends only on consumption.12 I can
express and solve this problem using Dynamic Programming and Bellman’s principle of optimality. I solve


























￿ is the bequest factor.13 By deriving the ﬁrst order






































































11 Phelps solved the inﬁnite horizon problem analytically assuming no labor income and using different forms of the utility
function.
12 This is the standard characterization of the utility function. In a slightly different setup, Alessie and Lusardi (1997b) introduce
habit formation, by considering a utility function that depends additionally on past consumption. See also Deaton (1992) for a
discussion of such a model.
13 Agents in this model care only about the absolute size of their bequests, leading to its been called the “egoistic” model of
bequests. A bequest factor of one would correspond to valuing bequest in the utility function as much as current consumption. The
importance of bequest motives is still an open issue in the literature. Here I take the position of acknowledging that bequests do
exist and explore the implications of changing the importance of the bequest motive in the utility function. Hurd (1987, 1989),
Bernheim (1991), Modigliani (1988), Wilhem (1996) and Laitner and Juster (1996) are some of the main references on the debate
over the signiﬁcance of bequests and altruism in the life cycle model. Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) stress the importance of
intergenerational transfers in aggregate capital accumulation.








































Here the logarithmic utility simpliﬁes the problem. Again taking ﬁrst order conditions with respect to









I then have an expression for VT































where ¡ gathers all the terms that do not depend on w. From here we can write VT
￿ 2 and again derive ﬁrst






























￿ T. From these decision rules, I can observe that as T grows large, the ﬁnite horizon solution with
bequests converges to the inﬁnite horizon solution, since the inﬂuence of the bequest parameter becomes
less important as the time horizon increases. In the inﬁnite horizon case with logarithmic utility and no




￿ w, as shown in Phelps (1962). The derivation
of the decision rules in the case of the CRRA utility function is similar though somewhat more involved and
is presented in the Appendix. Ben´ ıtez-Silva, Hall, Hitsch, Pauletto, and Rust (2000) present, among others,
the CARA utility case under certainty.
The ability to derive an analytical solution for this model allows me to evaluate the effectiveness of the
numerical methods, which are all that I have available in more complicated models. The exercise of solving
the model numerically is also interesting on its own given that the inﬁnite horizon version of this model
has been shown to be quite difﬁcult to replicate using numerical methods, even with the logarithmic utility
function, as discussed in Rust (1999a) and Ben´ ıtez-Silva, Hall, Hitsch, Pauletto, and Rust (2000).
The numerical procedure is by nature very similar to the analytical approach, involving backward re-
cursion starting in the last period of life. I discretize wealth and compute the optimal value of consumption
for all those wealth levels using bisection. Bisection is an iterative algorithm with all the components of a
nonlinear equation solver. It makes a guess, computes the iterative value, checks if the value is an accept-
able solution, and if not, iterates again. The stopping rule depends on the desired precision given that the
7solution is bracketed by the nature of the algorithm and that the round-off errors will probably not allow
us to increase the precision beyond a certain limit. In each iteration of the numerical solution, except for
the ﬁnal one where all uncertainties have been resolved, I have to compute the expectation in equation (6),
which is potentially the most computationally demanding step. For this I use Gauss-Legendre quadrature. I
also compute the derivative of this expectation using numerical differentiation, also requiring quadrature as
part of its routine. Here the analytical derivatives are simple to compute, but this is not always the case for
more complicated models. I therefore wish to evaluate the accuracy of the numerical strategy.
Gaussian quadrature approximates the integral through sums using rules to choose points and weights
based on the properties of orthogonal polynomials corresponding to the density function of the variable over
which I am integrating, in this case the draws of the interest rates following a log-normal distribution. The
points and weights are selected in such a way that ﬁnite-order polynomials can be integrated exactly using
quadrature formulae. The weights used have the natural interpretation of probabilities associated with inter-
vals around the quadrature points.14 At this point I am considering a one dimensional problem, for which
quadrature methods have been shown to be very accurate compared with other techniques of computing
expectations (integrals) such as Monte Carlo integration, Low Discrepancy sequences and weighted sums.15




￿ interval and then approximate it by a series of sums depending on the quadrature weights
and quadrature abscissae which I compute recursively, following readily available routines (e.g. Press
et al. 1992).16
An additional numerical technique that we use to solve the model completely is function approximation
by interpolation. Since savings in a given period are accumulated at a stochastic interest rate, next period’s
wealth will not necessarily fall in one of the grid points for which I have the value of the function already
calculated. Ideally I would solve the next period’s problem for any wealth level, but this is computationally
infeasible. Therefore, I use linear interpolation to ﬁnd the corresponding value of the function given the
values in the nearest grid points.17
The bisection algorithm that uses the quadrature and interpolation procedures eventually converges to
a maximum of the lifetime consumption problem for a given value of wealth in a given period (or reaches
14 For a detailed characterization of quadrature methods I refer the reader to Tauchen and Hussey (1991), Rust (1996),
Judd (1998), and Burnside (1999).
15 For an analysis of how different techniques perform in applied problems see Rust (1997).
16 I can write
￿ rV
￿ r















where wi are the quadrature weights and ui are the quadrature abscissae.
17 More sophisticated interpolation procedures can be used such as splines or Chebyshev interpolation. They are not considered
here, Ben´ ıtez-Silva, Hall, Hitsch, Pauletto, and Rust (2000) provide with a sensitivity analysis of the procedures used at each step
of similar numerical computations.
8the pre-decided tolerance level). This procedure is repeated until the solution of the ﬁrst-period problem is
obtained.
Once I have solved the model, I have a decision rule for every level of wealth in our initial grid. Here
I have chosen a grid space of 500 points; to gain accuracy more of these points are concentrated at low
wealth levels where the function is changing rapidly. Figures 1 and 2 show the decision rule of the con-
sumption/saving problem for wealth ranging from 0 to 100 units. For expositional purposes I have solved a
10-period model.
Figure 1 plots several decision rules given logarithmic utility. It ﬁrst plots the numerical solutions for
different time periods, denoted C1, C2, and so on. It also plots the solution of the inﬁnite horizon problem
borrowing from Phelps (1962), denoted by CINF in the ﬁgure. I have chosen a discount factor of 0.95 and
a bequest parameter of 0.6. Figure 2 plots the decision rule when I consider a CRRA, with risk aversion
parameter equal to 1.5, b
￿ 0
￿95, and bequest parameter equal to 0.6, I also plot the analytical solution of the
inﬁnite horizon problem, borrowing from Levhari and Srinivasan (1969). For both types of utility function
I observe that the consumption rules increase with wealth and time and that in very few periods I am fairly
close to the solution of the inﬁnite problems.
Figure 3 and 4 are concerned with comparing the numerical solutions with the true analytical solutions
derived above and in the Appendix. Iplot in both ﬁgures the percentage difference between the two solutions
in terms of the value of the true solution, for a sample of time periods. The numerical technique performs
quite well. For about half of the range of values, the numerical solution is very accurate with deviations
below 1%, for both types of utility functions. After that, errors are a bit larger, especially for early time
periods. For the ﬁrst period and for high levels of wealth the error reaches 12% to 13%, depending on the
utility function. These differences are the result of the extrapolation methodology for accounting for wealth
levels outside the grid of points I am solving over. I extrapolate linearly, what in some cases can lead to a
better than average return for the individual, this leads our agents to underconsume in order to proﬁt from
this advantage.
In Figures 5 and 6 I simulate this model using the numerical solution for the CRRA utility function.
I now model separately the mortality probabilities at every age, following the U.S. Life Tables for 1997.
That means that I assume all individuals die at age 85, and before that they are aware of the exogenous
probability of dying at every age. I report the results of 5,000 simulations of an 61-period model (simulating
an individual that starts making decisions at age 25 and dies at age 85) with 500 grid points for wealth in
9the 0 to 200,000 range.18 I plot consumption and wealth paths with an initial wealth level of 10,000.19 I
also consider several values for the parameters of interest. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, g is taken to be 1.5 (the
parameter of relative risk aversion), and it is increased to 2.5 in the second speciﬁcation (hg lines in the
plots). I then increase the bequest parameter to 0.6, leaving g
￿ 1
￿5 (bq lines in the plots), and ﬁnally, I
decrease the relative risk aversion parameter to 0.7 (lg lines in the ﬁgures).
I observe that people consume less at the beginning of their lives, with increased consumption in the ﬁnal
periods of life, given uncertain interest rates represented by draws from a truncated log-normal distribution.
Consumption does, however, decrease if the risk aversion parameter is less than 1. Focusing on the pattern
of wealth accumulation, we observe that individuals deaccumulate their wealth gradually. We also see that
increasing the relative risk aversion parameter has the effect of making consumption less smooth (with
higher wealth accumulation), while decreasing the parameter from the benchmark value of 1.5 leads to
more smoothing (with lower wealth accumulation). We can also observe the expected effect of the bequest
parameter: those with a higher concern for their offspring, represented by a higher valuation of bequests in
the utility function, consume at almost every age less than do those with a lower bequest parameter. This
former population also accumulates more when young. These results regarding the effect of the bequest
motives are consistent with, and in fact extend, the theoretical model of Hurd (1987) to the case of agents
with various levels of bequest.
This model is meant to serve as a benchmark for the models discussed next and for the introduction of
annuities and Social Security in Section 4.
3 Introducing the Labor/Leisure Decision
I next tackle the issue of extending the model of Section 2 to allow for an endogenous labor supply decision.
Utility is now a function of consumption and leisure, and agents will optimally choose both in every period

















18 The simulations in this section and throughout the paper represent averages of the thousand of simulations performed. A
simulation starts from the ﬁrst period of working lives and through interpolation ﬁnds the optimal paths of consumption/saving (for
the model in this section), leisure, and annuities after drawing from the distribution of the unobservables. I need starting values for
wealth, wages, and annuities (if applicable), and using the same parameters as for the previously solved model we stored the paths
of the relevant variables and then average them out.
19 This is approximately the net worth reported by Poterba (1998), using the Survey of Consumer Finances, for individuals at
the beginning of their working lives.
10again in ﬁnite horizon. The within-period utility function is assumed to be Isoelastic and Cobb-Douglas


















where g is the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion and h is the valuation of consumption versus leisure.20
Consumption and leisure are substitutes or complements depending on the value of g as discussed in Heck-
man (1974) and Low (1998), with the cutoff approximately equal to 1.21 In most of the analysis I will
assume values of g larger than 1, implicitly assuming substitutability between consumption and leisure. I
will assume that the agent has only three choices with respect to the labor decision: part-time, full-time,
or out of the labor force.22 It is also important to emphasize that for computational convenience we have
chosen a lower bound on leisure equal to 20% of the available time during a given period.23
3.1 Deterministic Wages
First, I will assume that wages follow a deterministic path which peaks around age 50 and then smoothly
decreases. Given that I allow for consumption and leisure to inﬂuence each other using a CRRA utility
function, and considering that I am concerned with corner solutions for the labor decision, the model can
only be solved numerically. To do so I employ the techniques presented in Section 2.
I use Dynamic Programming to characterize this problem and again solve by backward induction. The



































where w represent wages and leisure (labor) is chosen among the three possible states. Once I obtain the
optimal decision rules using the bisection algorithm, I then solve recursively. I can write the value function

































20 See Browning and Meghir (1991) for evidence on non-separability of consumption and leisure within periods.
21 Heckman presents a model of perfect foresight and shows that by introducing the labor supply decision it is possible to
reconcile the empirical evidence on consumption paths with the life cycle framework, without resorting to credit market restrictions
or uncertainty. Low’s (1998, 1999) work is fairly close in nature to our analysis, although he abstracts from capital uncertainty but
allows borrowing. French’s (2000) model is also close to our work, although it focuses on the retirement decision. Flod´ en (1998)
uses a two-period model to illustrate the importance of considering labor supply as endogenous when analyzing consumption and
saving under uncertainty.
22 I solve in this case a 30-period model to reduce the computational burden of the solution process, but in Section 4 I present
the results of a 61 period model.
23 Different values of this parameter have essentially no effect on the solutions presented below.
11The value function still remains unidimensional since there is no uncertainty about the wages. I solve this
model again by bisection, computing the expectations by quadrature and interpolating the values of the next
period’s value functions.
Once I have solved the model, I simulate it given starting wealth values. The capital uncertainty is
characterized by draws from a truncated log-normal distribution. Figures 7-9 present plots of the paths of
consumption, labor supply, and wealth accumulation resulting from this 30-period model, which I map into
an age proﬁle for expositional purposes. I set initial wealth equal to 10,000 units and consider varying levels
of the relative risk aversion parameter, bequest motive, and the valuation of consumption versus leisure in
the utility function.
These results have several interesting features. First, as can be seen from Figure 7, consumption tracks
income for a signiﬁcant amount of time before age 40, at which point the consumption path begins to





￿ 7, eta in the ﬁgure) receive lower wages because they work mostly part-time, although
they are able to maintain an average consumption level higher than their part-time wage level starting at
about age 40, since some individuals choose to work full-time. The pattern of labor supply is equally
interesting. Agents with a high valuation of consumption seem to work full time most of their lives, except
at the beginning when their wages are low and they have initial wealth to smooth consumption. Later
in life, our model is able to pick up the decrease in labor supply due to lower wages. It is important to
emphasize that those with higher bequest motives (bq in the ﬁgures, bequest parameter equal to 0.6 versus
0.1 for the other curves) work more on average than those with lower bequest parameters. In Figure 9 I
show the wealth accumulation over the life cycle implied by the model. The pattern here is fairly close
to the estimated, simulated, and reported results of several papers (e.g., Hubbard et al. 1994, Attanasio and
Weber 1995, Attanasio et al. 1997, Alessie and Lusardi 1997a, Alessie et al. 1997, Poterba 1998, and Cagetti
1999) reﬂecting empirical data quite closely. We see little accumulation early in life, and then after age 40
agents begin to accumulate higher levels of wealth which only decreases near the end of life. We can also
see from the graph that those with higher bequest motives start deaccumulating their wealth later in life and
than those with higher valuation for leisure start to accumulate earlier in life. Finally, those that are more risk
averse start accumulating later in life and end up accumulating less resources than the rest of individuals.
This model is broadly consistent with some features of the data that show very low savings rates among
young individuals, with an increase only later in life.24
24 I have also simulated a model with initial wealth equal to 50,000 units. In this case the model predicts very similar behavior,
except at the beginning of life when wealthy individuals delay their entrance into the labor force and consume out of their initial
endowment.
123.2 Stochastic and Serially Correlated Wages
I next make the model more realistic by introducing income uncertainty, while maintaining the endogeneity
of the labor/leisure decision.25 I start by introducing stochastic i
￿ i
￿ d
￿ wages from a log-normal distribution
with achanging mean that follows the deterministic proﬁle used above.26 Thisfeature complicates the model
because the value functions now depend on the uncertain wage realizations. I write the problem solved by



































where labor is again chosen among the three possible states. Once I obtain the decision rules numerically I




































































The interpolation of the values of the next period value function has to be carried out in two dimensions, a
slightly more cumbersome and slower procedure. The double integrals are again solved by Gauss-Legendre
quadrature, but I use iterated integration since I am assuming independence of wages and interest rates.27
Figures 10-12 show the consumption, labor, and wealth accumulation paths for this model. The main
difference from the case of deterministic wages is that individuals start to save and accumulate later in life,
and work on average a bit more later in life, ultimately accumulating a higher level of wealth before they
enter the deaccumulation phase.28
25 I do not allow here for nonzero correlation between income shocks and asset returns. For a discussion of this possibility at the
micro level see Davis and Willen (2000).
26 An important parameter to be chosen here is the variance of the stochastic component of wages. I use in this case values of
this parameter from estimations of the variance of innovations to wages. I use a number that is equivalent to say that one standard
deviation of the innovation in wages accounts for around 10% of wages. See French (2000) for a recent contribution to this literature
and the references therein.
27 Given that the value function depends on wealth and wages, we needed to discretize both variables in order to approximate
the integrals, using 50 points for wealth and 50 points for wages. I found that using fewer points signiﬁcantly affected the accuracy
of the calculations, leading to possible erroneous conclusions.
28 Lusardi (1998) presents empirical results pertaining to the role of income variance in a consumption/saving model. She ﬁnds
that income variation seems to affect precautionary savings, but the ﬁnal effect on wealth accumulation is not too large. Our results
indicate that individuals are using their labor supply to hedge the income uncertainty, meaning that they increase or decrease leisure
depending on the draw of wages they face, resulting in a smaller effect of uncertainty on the other variables. That is why going from
deterministic wages to stochastic one does not have a very large impact in this model. Low (1998, 1999) also makes this point.
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￿ wages. The solution method does not change signiﬁcantly from the last model, and only the careful
manipulation of the serially correlated component has to be considered.
Figures 13-15 show the paths of the relevant variables. Our results do not show striking differences with
the previous graphs. Consumption proﬁles again track income paths very closely up to age 45, when wealth
accumulation starts in meaningful amounts. Higher serial correlation leads to accumulation and deaccumu-
lation slightly later in life, since individuals seem to take advantage of the effects of serial correlation once
their peak earnings years have been reached. The labor supply proﬁle is apparently quite similar to those
shown before, with individuals facing higher serial correlation in their wages working a bit longer than the
rest. However, the reader should notice the trend in the simulated labor supply from ﬁgure 8, to 11, to 14.
As uncertainty grows individuals reduce their participation later and later in life because they are indeed us-
ing their labor supply decision (that is now endogenous) to hedge that additional uncertainty. Therefore, in
Figure 14, although wages are declining (the price of leisure is going down), individuals stayed in the labor
force because of the uncertain trajectory of wages ahead of them. I plot the paths for different values of the
serial correlation parameter. With high correlation, we plot the case of individuals starting with wealth of
10,000 units and initial wages of 30,000 units, the initial wage for those with low serial correlation is 20,000
units.
Fromthesolution and simulation of these models Icanconclude that alife cycle modelwith endogenized
labor supply behaves quite consistently with the empirical data on wealth accumulation and consumption
proﬁles and that wealth accumulation seems to start only in mid-life. Additionally, such a model captures
the gradual exiting from the labor force by older individuals who face lower wages, declining uncertainty,
and who have a lower serial correlation of wages once they reach a certain age. This model seems well-
suited for analyzing important policy issues regarding the effects on savings and labor supply of reforms in
social insurance programs.
4 Endogenously chosen Annuities
In this section I extend the models presented in Section 2 and Section 3.1, the consumption/saving model
and the extended model of endogenous labor with deterministic wages, by allowing individuals to purchase
14an annuity with a fraction or all of their wealth at any point in their lives. I also introduce a stylized
Social Security system in the endogenous labor/leisure model with annuities. I endogenize the annuitization
decision by providing the agents with the possibility of exchanging a certain number of dollars today for
a stream of income over the rest of their lives. The annuity has a given rate of return computed using the
average age-speciﬁc mortality probabilities in the population, making it an actuarially fair annuity. In the
simulation I can easily make the annuity less than actuarially fair and analyze the effects on individual
behavior. The cost of the annuity, calculated as the net present value of the promised stream of income,
cannot exceed the total wealth of the agent at the time of the purchase of the annuity. This is a single
premium immediate life annuity. The decision to annuitize is unique and non-reversible. These last two
assumptions mean that individuals can only annuitize once in their lives. I do not, however, place any
restriction on the timing of this annuity.29
The ﬁrst model presented here is similar to that of Friedman and Warshawsky (1990), although they
focus on older individuals and on the issue of annuity pricing in order to explain the almost non-existence
of a market for these instruments. Another difference is that they force individuals to invest a proportion
of their wealth in an actuarially fair social annuity, without considering investment uncertainty. Brugiavini
(1993) focuses on the role of longevity uncertainty in the purchase of annuities in a two/three period model.
She also considers a model that allows for income uncertainty and the different behavior of employees and
entrepreneurs. Mitchell et al. (1999) use the term structure of interest rate rather than a ﬁxed interest rate, to
calculate the expected present discounted value of the annuities in a model of uncertain lifetime. They ﬁnd
that retirees should value annuities even if they are not actuarially fair. Brown (1999a), extending the model
of Yaari (1965), focuses on the role of annuities when individuals face an uncertain lifetime, using data on
older Americans to construct a measure of the consumer’s valuation of additional annuitization.30 However,
his model abstracts from capital uncertainty and does not endogenize the annuity decision in the general
sense that Ido. Brown (1999b) uses data on older individuals totest and ultimately reject the “Annuity Offset
Model,” the hypothesis that old individuals purchase term insurance to offset the excessive annuitization
imposed by the government social programs. Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) also use a Yaari-type model to
emphasize the important role of the family as an incomplete annuities market, with the annuity decision
made at exogenous points in time. Eichenbaum and Peled (1987) use a two period model to underline the
over accumulation of private capital in a model of competitive annuities with adverse selection.31
29 I do not consider at this point the role of taxes in the decision to annuitize, see Gentry and Milano (1998) for a discussion of
the effects of taking taxes into account.
30 Davies (1981) extends Yaari’s model of uncertain lifetime and uses it to explain the low levels of deaccumulation by the
elderly. Sheshinski (1999) also extending Yaari’s theoretical model, accounts for retirement and consumption decisions, ﬁnding
that continuous annuitization is better than annuitization at retirement.
31 Walliser(1997, 1998) discusses the role of annuities in a social insurance framework, Boskin et al. (1998) provide an overview
15The most important differences between our analysis below and that of previous research is the consid-
eration of the labor/leisure decision and the introduction of a fairly realistic social security system, changes
which yield striking effects on the results.
The agents are again choosing consumption in order to maximize utility over their lifetime but now
have the choice of converting part of their wealth to an annuity. This annuity is actuarially fair in the sense
that its rate of return depends on the average mortality probabilities in the population, and it provides a
stream of income until the time of death, which can be considered uncertain given that I introduce mortality
probabilities.32 The annuity premium A
￿ a
￿ , where a is the annuity received every period and st are the























￿ 1, and I am assuming that agents receive the ﬁrst payment in the same period in which
they annuitize. I again solve this model by backward induction using numerical Dynamic Programming
techniques.
4.1 Endogenous Annuities in the Consumption/Saving Model
I ﬁrst analyze the introduction of endogenous annuities in the consumption/saving model without labor. The
decision in the last period of life is very similar to that of the consumption/saving problem, but now the value





















In this last period I do not allow for the annuity decision to occur, since annuitizing would return exactly
what they put into the annuity, assuming no transaction costs. But even if agents do not actually decide
to annuitize, it is possible that they have annuitized earlier in their lives; thus, I must solve for the value
function under as many combinations of wealth and annuity values as possible.33 In the simulation part of
the model, agents reaching the last period of life without having annuitized will not annuitize in the last
period. Recall that agents still face capital uncertainty and life time uncertainty.



























of the role of annuities in the economy, and Brown et al. (2001) analyze the ﬁnancial aspects of annuity markets.
32 The concept of “actuarially fair” falls slightly short to deﬁne the ﬁnancial instrument I am allowing agents to purchase, because
they are also a riskless asset, as opposed to the risky alternative capital investment.
33 As in the previous section, I discretize the two variables that enter the value function in order to approximate the integrals and





￿ w, and to simplify the derivation I have assumed a constant mortality rate, again this will
not be assumed in the formal solution and simulation of the model. Agents who have already annuitized
will receive a stream a and subsequently ﬁnd the optimal consumption rule. Agents who have not already
annuitized are able to decide what portion of their wealth will be put into the annuity.
In order to solve this model I conduct a maximization in stages. First, for a given value of the annuity I
compute the optimal consumption rule via bisection, and again use quadrature and interpolation to calculate
the expectations (the integrals in the model). This is embedded in another bisection algorithm for calculating
the optimal fraction of wealth to annuitize and the implied annuity to be received in the periods ahead,



























































I solve this by the same methods explained above. The outer maximization solution method is very similar,























































































where ˜ w is wealth next period. The left hand side of this expression can be understood as the marginal value
of an additional unit of annuity and the right hand side as its marginal cost. The agent will try to set these
equal when calculating the optimal annuity in every period.
Bisection searches over the values of the annuity (which imply optimal levels of consumption calculated
by the inner bisection algorithm), using quadrature to calculate the expectations and again interpolating the
values of the next period value function. The interpolation has to be performed in two dimensions, which
complicates and slows down the procedure slightly.
Once I have solved this model, I simulate it and construct consumption, wealth accumulation, and
annuity paths over the life cycle. The results are quite striking. In Figure 16 I replicate the model of Section
172 for a starting wealth value of 10,000 units in a 61-period model, which I then map into a lifetime age
proﬁle. Consumption is again increasing over the lifetime due to the investment uncertainty as well as the
mortality uncertainty that is now explicit. Figure 17 shows the consumption path resulting from averaging
2,500 simulations for individuals with a starting wealth value of 10,000 units. We can see the smoothness
of the path compared with that of Figure 16, for the same starting value of wealth and the same parameter
values. In fact, consumption is practically ﬂat around 400 units. The contrast is sharper for increased values
of the parameter of relative risk aversion as shown in Figures 16 and 17.
In Figure 17 I also show the average annuity value received (a in the graph), which changes slightly at
the beginning but remains mostly ﬂat over the course of the lifetime. I report two different speciﬁcations:
the ﬁrst has a relative risk aversion parameter of 1.5, and the second (hg in the plot) has g
￿ 2
￿ 5.34
A higher relative risk aversion leads to less smooth consumption and wealth accumulation is higher, as
we see in Figure 18, something consistent with the idea that higher risk aversion should lead to less smooth
paths for lifetime consumption and higher paths of accumulation. Once annuities are available more risk
averse individuals are also eager to smooth their consumption, and purchase the annuities early in life.
Figure 19 reports wealth accumulation and the evolution of the value annuitized (A in the graph) at each
stage of the life cycle. There is a clear difference between this wealth path and that of Figure 18, which
replicates the model of Section 2, implying that once individuals are able to annuitize they prefer to spend
their wealth buying the annuity very early in their lives, withmore risk averse individuals again beneﬁting the
most. The annuitization happens very early in this endowment consumption/saving model with investment
uncertainty, and for average agents, amounts to more than half their wealth in the initial periods. Depending
on the realizations of interest rates agents sometimes annuitize later in life and in a lower proportion, a
seemingly reasonable result. These results are also consistent with Mitchell et al. (1999) suggesting that
our model extends their simpliﬁed stochastic life cycle model to a full dynamic characterization of the
annuitization decision in the presence of bequest motives and capital uncertainty, allowing for annuitization
to happen at any point in the life cycle and with any fraction of the individual’s wealth.
I have also simulated a model with less than actuarially fair annuities, by calculating the annuity receipts
assuming that the insurance company multiplies the actual mortality probabilities by a factor l
￿ 1. Annu-
itization is still chosen by individuals but now lifetime consumption and the annuity receipts are uniformly
lower.
These results have several interesting implications. First, in a simple model of consumption and saving
34 Here I consider actuarially fair annuities. Non-actuarial fairness seems to be very common in this market, this can result from
the fact that the insurance companies selling the annuities face transaction costs and adverse selection. The latter due to the fact
that potentially healthier individuals are more likely to buy the annuity and therefore obtain an implicit higher rate of return from
their purchase.
18decisions with investment uncertainty, the possibility of annuitizing wealth is used by individuals to smooth
their consumption stream almost entirely. If we interpret this mechanism as a pseudo-social insurance
system, there is no doubt as to the importance of the effects that such a scheme has on the microeconomic
behavior of agents. To make this point clearer Table 1, in its second column, provides calculations of the
welfare effects of introducing annuities in this consumption/saving model. The table shows the equivalent
variations in percentages of current wealth for individuals of different ages and initial level of resources.
The equivalent variation as expressed here, provides a measure of the fraction of wealth a given individual
is willing to give up to have access to the annuity market. We can see in the table that regardless of age
and initial ﬁnancial conditions the access to annuities is highly valued, individuals are willing to given up
between 50% and 60% of their wealth to be able to purchase the annuity and smooth consumption as we
saw in Figure 17. These results come to reinforce the conclusions of Mitchell et al. (1999) in terms of
welfare effects annuities. I should also emphasize that I have done the same calculations but allowing for
some degree of actuarial unfairness and the results are that even in that case the gains from having access to
the annuity market is substantial and of a similar order of magnitude.
However, I want to explore the reasons for the lack of availability of such annuities in the current capital
markets. Some researchers emphasize the issue of pricing, and some point to adverse selection; yet others
blame it on the high capital returns to equities. Our average results seem to provide some insights into
the “annuity puzzle,” the question of why the annuity market is so narrow. If it is optimal for an average
individual to annuitize between 50% and 70% of their wealth, as our model suggests, and Social Security
accounts forapproximately that proportion oftheir wealth (Friedman andWarshawsky 1990), itisvery likely
that the lowdemand forannuities that weobserve isthe result ofoptimal decision making by individuals. For
some individuals Social Security would provide less than the optimal level of annuitization, causing them to
buy additional annuity notes in the market. For others, S.S. would lead to over-annuitization and they might
react by buying life insurance to offset the imposed annuity purchases through the social insurance system.
Even if the reader agrees with this line of reasoning we are still left with an explanation that comes from
outside the model I am solving, interestingly, the most novel results and insights come from the extension
of this model to endogenize the labor decision and introduce Social Security, which I consider next.
4.2 Endogenous Annuities in the Extended Framework
Our conjecture regarding the effects of extending the classical life cycle model with annuities to endogenize
labor supply, in the same fashion as in Section 3, is twofold. First, such a model could help shed new light
on long standing questions such as the effect of Social Security on the micro behavior of agents. Second,
19it is likely to provide further insights into the “annuity puzzle.” The conjecture regarding annuities is that
once we introduce labor supply we should see the annuity decision delayed in the life cycle, given that
individuals use their labor as an insurance instrument when they are young. The results conﬁrm some of
these conjectures, and go even further.
I once again proceed by numerical dynamic programming to solve a model of endogenous consump-
tion/saving, labor/leisure, and endogenous annuities, employing backward induction. I can write the indi-








































where t represents the Social Security tax I discuss below, and ss the Social Security beneﬁts to which
the individual is entitled. I then obtain the optimal decision rules using the sequential bisection algorithms
















































￿ ss and st are the age-speciﬁc mortality probabilities. The computa-
tional burden of this model is similar to the model without labor supply since I assume a deterministic path
of wages. I solve this model again by bisection, computing the expectations by quadrature and interpolating
the values of the next period’s value functions.
An additional extension, already considered in the formulation of (28) and (29), is to introduce Social
Security, and I do so in a stylized manner. Assuming a deterministic path of wages, and further assuming
that I am analyzing the behavior of an individual born in 1937, that will be 65 as of the year 2002, I can
compute the beneﬁts that such a person will receive had he worked at least 35 years since the age of 21.35 I
follow the formulae provided in SSA (2000) and assume that individuals can only start receiving beneﬁts at
age 65. I do, however, allow for work after that age and control for the earnings test provision to calculate the
corresponding beneﬁts.36 I also tax wages at the current individual tax rate (6.2%), free from the Disability
Insurance withholding (given that I do not model Disability Insurance in this framework), and add the taxes
paid by the employer (6.2%), since those payments can be considered as discounted from a theoretical before
35 This is a fairly simpliﬁed characterization of the current Social Security system, which in our model could result in an artiﬁcial
trend towards early retirement, given that agents could potentially foresee the gains from not working or working less as age 65
approaches, because their beneﬁts will remain the same regardless of their working history. Our results seem not to suffer from this
problem, as we will see below. Thus, although stylized, our characterization of the current Social Security system is a good ﬁrst
approximation to evaluate behaviorally meaningful responses.
36 See Myers (1993) for a comprehensive review of Social Security rules, and Friedberg (2000) for a discussion of the effects
of the earnings test on labor supply. The Social Security Administration website is an excellent source of information not only for
recipients, and future recipients, but also for researchers: www.ssa.gov.
20all taxes salary.37
The results from this model are presented in Figures 20-25. The ﬁgures present the paths of consump-
tion, labor supply, annuities, and wealth chosen optimally by individuals over their life cycle. I can compare
these results both with the ones presented in the previous subsection and with the ones in Section 3.1. The
most important effects of introducing labor supply are twofold: ﬁrst, the annuity decision is delayed from
the initial periods of the life cycle (around the early 20’s in the previous model) to around mid-life; second,
the average individual now annuitizes a smaller proportion of his or her wealth, becoming a less important
insurance instrument for these agents. This effect is even stronger once I introduce Social Security, with
annuitization becoming even more marginal compared with the overall resources of individuals at any given
age. This last result sheds new light on the “annuity puzzle,” leading us to conclude that in a more complete
dynamic framework it is less of a puzzle why annuities are less attractive as an insurance instrument than
has been believed.
This conclusion is even stronger once I calculate again the welfare effects of introducing an annuities
market. Table 1 shows in columns three and four the equivalent variations in terms of percentage of wealth
resulting from introducing annuities in a model with the labor/leisure as endogenous in the absence or pres-
ence of Social Security. The difference in welfare effects are striking specially for young individuals, and
also those with higher initial resources. Once the labor/leisure decision is endogenenized and utility depends
not only on consumption but also on leisure the welfare gains from having access to the annuities market
are much smaller, dropping from around 60% to single digits. I can conclude that in this extended model
annuities are still valued by individuals but to a much lesser extent than in the simpler consumption/saving
model that all previous work in the area has considered.
A very important issue to highlight at this point, which is also valid for the model presented in the
previous subsection, is that this partial and residual annuitization by the average individual is consistent
with the theory that says that an individual would in principle annuitize all its wealth if the annuity were
actuarially fair. The behavior of a single individual in our model in front of the possibility of purchasing an
actuarially fair annuity, given a state of the world and the expectations over the future states of the world, is
more heterogenous than the average results (product of thousands of simulations) show. Some individuals
never annuitize, while others annuitize very late in life, but basically all of those who annuitize, no matter at
what age, put 100% of their current wealth in that annuity, as a portfolio selection approach to this problem
would tend to predict. Figures 24 and 25 show the effects of considering a less than actuarially fair annuity
in the model, annuitization is reduced further, delayed in time and in many cases no annuity is purchased
37 The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of the Social Security system that I introduce is 1.6522%, a fairly realistic number given
the assumptions made to compute the beneﬁts. See the discussion in Geanakoplos et al. (1999).
21over the life time.
In some respects the extended model presented in this section is close to that of Bodie and Samuelson
(1989), and Bodie, Merton and Samuelson (1992), in that it puts together the life cycle consumption/saving
model with the portfolio decision, allowing for ﬂexible labor supply. Their research concentrates in the
continuous time case, and the effect of making labor supply ﬂexible in the investment mix by individuals,
and not on the consumption/saving and labor/leisure choices over the life cycle. Furthermore, they do not
consider annuitization in their model. However, I consider that the insights from this work complement
their results quite nicely. They ﬁnd that allowing for labor supply ﬂexibility in the traditional life cycle con-
sumption/saving model leads to more investment in the risky asset, assuming negative correlation between
investment returns and the labor income innovations. I ﬁnd that even in the absence of this correlation,
introducing labor supply in the model, allow us to explain why individuals would not choose annuities as
their preferred investment product.
The richness of the model allows me to go even further, and I can show two very important effects of
Social Security on behavior. First, we can see the labor supply response of individuals to the reception of
Social Security beneﬁts: they decrease their participation on average to part-time work when they reach
age 65, but in some individual cases, complete retirement is chosen.38 Second, the effect on savings and
individual capital accumulation are not too striking, reducing them slightly and leading to an increase in ac-
cumulation after age 65. These results complement and extend the classic discussions of Feldstein (1974),
Kotlikoff (1979) and Hubbard (1987), regarding the effects of Social Security on saving behavior by allow-
ing for the annuities market to play a role along with the public social insurance system.39 In both cases
these results give important insights into classic questions regarding the role of Social Security in shaping
individual behavior.40 Another interesting exercise that this model allows us to perform is to assess the labor
supply effects of the recent elimination of the earnings test for individuals 65 and older. The simulations
shown in Figure 21 suggest that the effects can be substantial, leading to a sizable increase in labor supply
38 As discussed by Rust and Phelan (1997), to show the effects of Social Security on labor supply is a surprisingly difﬁcult task.
Task that their work and our model achieve successfully. French (2000) also highlights the effects of social insurance on the labor
supply of the current and future old. However, in most cases our model predicts only partial retirement. There are several ways
of making this model match the data better by introducing realistic features in the model; ﬁrst, it is not difﬁcult to argue that the
within period valuation of consumption vs. leisure in the model can be changing over the life cycle, and if the valuation of leisure
increases with age, along with a S.S. effect, we could easily see a clearer trend towards full retirement, the chosen value of h that I
chose is completely arbitrary since we do not ﬁnd in the literature any reliable estimate for this parameter; second, it would also be
realistic to introduce health status as an important variable in the life cycle model that could again have an effect on this valuation
of consumption vs. leisure, leading people with different health conditions to change their valuations, what could potentially lead
to a clearer retirement trend; ﬁnally a more realistic characterization of the Social Security system coupled with the introduction of
health insurance considerations could have a stronger effect on the hazard rates after the early retirement or normal retirement age.
39 Page (1998) provides a survey of the empirical literature which tackles this issue.
40 ˙ Imrohoroˇ glu et al. (1999b) using a different model ﬁnd results qualitatively similar to those reported here regarding the decline
of labor supply and wealth accumulation once Social Security is introduced.
22among those 65 to 69.
Finally, I can compare the welfare of individuals with and without Social Security in the extended
consumption/saving model with endogenous labor supply and endogenous annuities. I compute how much
extra wealth we would have to give to individuals at the beginning of life to make them as well off in a
world with Social Security as they would be in a world without public social insurance. Remember that
these individuals have access to risky assets and fairly priced annuities. The results show that depending on
the initial level of wealth and annuities the (negative) compensating variation can be substantial, suggesting
that a young individual would be better off in a world without Social Security.41 I refer the reader to Rust,
Buchinsky, and Ben´ ıtez-Silva (2002) for amorecomplete discussion ofthe welfare effects ofSocial Security,
they present a more formal model of the Social Security rules and allow for income uncertainty and show
that young individuals would have to be compensated due to the existence of Social Security but that those
over the age of 40 seem to be willing to pay to keep the social insurance system in place.
5 Conclusions
This paper has presented several models of life cycle consumption/savings and labor/leisure decision mak-
ing under uncertainty. I ﬁrst present a benchmark ﬁnite horizon consumption/saving problem and solve it
analytically and then use numerical dynamic programming techniques to validate the methodology used
throughout the paper. I ﬁnd that the decision rule of the ﬁnite horizon model with bequests converges to
the inﬁnite horizon solution. I also ﬁnd that numerical methods approximate the ﬁnite horizon version of
Phelps (1962) model quite well. I then present a model that endogenizes labor supply, allowing ﬁrst for
deterministic wages, and then introducing income uncertainty. I conclude that the model is consistent with
consumption and wealth accumulation proﬁles in the data and that precautionary savings can even increase
when I consider that labor supply (another source of accumulating precautionary balances) is endogenous,
a result consistent with Low (1998). The model also shows the reduction of labor force participation at the
end of the life cycle.
The paper then introduces the possibility of endogenously choosing annuities in a consumption/saving
framework with capital uncertainty, life uncertainty and bequest, later extended to endogenize the la-
bor/leisure decision. Agents can choose to annuitize part or all their wealth at any point of their lives,
41 These welfare effects of Social Security have to be taken with caution given that, ﬁrst, I am ignoring general equilibrium
effects that can be substantial specially when such a radical policy change is implemented; second this model does not include
income uncertainty, and it is reasonable to believe that in the presence of income uncertainty Social Security has an additional
intrinsic value for individuals; and third that I am ignoring possible risk pooling or risk sharing in the household that would make
the introduction of a Social Security system have less of an impact on individual behavior, leading to lower overall welfare effects
(see e.g. Kotlikoff and Spivak 1981, and Kotlikoff, Spivak and Shoven 1987, for a discussion of this last point).
23but they can do this only once. This model can be understood as a privatized system with no mandatory
contributions, but with a one-time opportunity to annuitize. I then include a more traditional Social Security
system. The solution is consistent with some early results in the literature and in a sense generalizes those
models. I ﬁnd that in the simple consumption/saving model agents do choose to annuitize a large portion of
their wealth and that they do so early in life, allowing them to smooth consumption considerably compared
with the behavior observed in the benchmark model. I provide welfare comparisons that show how highly
valued is for individuals the access to the annuities market. Once I take into account the labor decision,
annuities are bought later in life and on average represent a small percentage of average wealth holdings, an
effect which becomes even clearer when I introduce Social Security. The welfare comparisons for this case
show that in the extended model annuities increase welfare only slightly. I also show that labor supply and
wealth accumulation react to the incentives set forth by Social Security, and that a young individual would
have to be compensated with a substantial increase in wealth to be as well off in a world with S.S. as in a
world without it. I claim that this complete model of endogenous consumption, labor, and annuity decisions
provides important insights into the “annuity puzzle” since the lack of demand for annuities can be the result
of optimal behavior once labor supply and Social Security are accounted for.
The policy implications of these results indicate that the government should pay special attention to
the rules affecting withdrawal of funds in any privatized schemed to be considered since the interaction of
these rules with the retirement and labor supply decisions can lead to individuals avoiding annuitization
when possible if incentives are not properly studied. The model presented here can be considered a tool
to experiment with the possible rules governing a privatized system where annuitization will be part of the
ﬁnancial options that individuals are presented with.
There are several possible extensions of the model(s) presented here. Rust, Buchinsky, and Ben´ ıtez-
Silva (2002) extend this model and that of Rust and Phelan (1997) to account for disability insurance and
Medicare, and model more closely retirement and social insurance incentives. Iamalso planning toallow for
added uncertainty through health shocks whichcan becorrelated withwages, aswellasmortality uncertainty
based on life tables, instead of embedding it in the discount factor. Another extension would explicitly
consider borrowing, as in the consumption/saving literature. The model could eventually also allow for
private pensions, which are in a sense proxied by the private annuities in the current model. Our model can
also be used to estimate underlying parameter values following the simulation techniques in Gourinchas and
Parker (1999), and French (2000) given data on the variables of interest.
Finally, another extension of this model attempts to integrate the job search decision into the life cycle
dynamic maximization framework introduced here (See Ben´ ıtez-Silva 2002). Both young and older workers
search for new jobs while out of work and on the job in non-trivial proportions. This activity should be taken
24into account in a life cycle model given the importance of the outcomes for the future path of earnings,
wealth accumulation, and lifetime utility. Such a unifying framework would extend the life cycle utility
maximization model and reconcile these two bodies of literature, which although theoretically intertwined
(See Siven 1974, and Seater 1977), have evolved in different directions.
25Figure 1: Consumption Decision Rule. Logarith-
mic Utility
Figure 2: Consumption Decision Rule. CRRAUtil-
ity
Figure 3: Computed vs. True Decision Rule. Log-
arithmic Utility
Figure 4: Computed vs. True Decision Rule.
CRRA Utility
26Figure 5: Simulated Consumption. CRRA Utility
Figure 6: Simulated Wealth Accumulation. CRRA Utility
27Figure 7: Simulated Consumption. Deterministic Wages
Figure 8: Simulated Labor Supply. Deterministic Wages
28Figure 9: Simulated Wealth. Deterministic Wages
Figure 10: Simulated Consumption. Stochastic Wages
29Figure 11: Simulated Labor Supply. Stochastic Wages
Figure 12: Simulated Wealth. Stochastic Wages
30Figure 13: Simulated Consumption. Serially Correlated Wages
Figure 14: Simulated Labor Supply. Serially Correlated Wages
Figure 15: Simulated Wealth. Serially Correlated Wages
31Figure 16: Simulated Consumption. C/S Problem. CRRA Utility
Figure 17: Simulated Consumption and Annuities. C/S Problem. CRRA Utility
32Figure 18: Simulated Wealth Accumulation. C/S Problem. CRRA Utility
Figure 19: Simulated Wealth and Annuity Costs. C/S Problem. CRRA Utility
33Figure 20: Simulated Consumption and Annuities. Full Model.
Figure 21: Simulated Labor Supply. Full Model.
34Figure 22: Simulated Wealth and Annuity Premiums, without S.S.
Figure 23: Simulated Wealth and Annuity Premiums, with S.S.
35Figure 24: Simulated Wealth and Annuity Premiums, without S.S.
Figure 25: Simulated Wealth and Annuity Premiums, with S.S.
36Table 1. Introducing Annuities. Welfare Comparisons: Equivalent Variation in Percentages.
Age and Wealth Consumption/Saving C/S and Labor/Leisure C/S, L/L and Social Security
25 and 10,000 63 15 9
25 and 50,000 73 4 2
45 and 10,000 60 49 33
45 and 50,000 68 15 12
65 and 10,000 53 60 50
65 and 50,000 54 31 17
3
7Appendix
In this Appendix we derive the closed form solution of the ﬁnite horizon version of Phelps (1962) consump-
tion/saving problem assuming a CRRA utility function. Our derivation is also close in nature to the one
performed in Levhari and Srinivasan (1969). We can again solve this problem relying on Dynamic Pro-
























where g is the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion and K is the bequest factor, characterized as a number be-





































































































































Here in order to derive the ﬁrst order condition with respect to consumption we assume, as in Lavhari
and Srinivasan (1969), that the value function is differentiable and that the differential and expected value
operators can be interchanged. The f
￿ o


































































































42 We also follow in this case the “egoistic” model of bequests.







































2 and denoting E
￿ ˜ r














We then substitute back in the formula for cT





































given the similarity with expression (8) in the text it is easy to see how backward induction would lead us to


























































We can also see that if g is equal to 1 we are back to the logarithmic utility case and the expression for cT
￿ 1
above is equivalent to (8), which is a special case of the expression above. It is also important to emphasize
that this expression is the ﬁnite horizon counterpart to the one obtained in Levhari and Srinivasan (1969)
once a bequest motive is introduced, and that their results regarding the effects of uncertainty (decreasing
proportion of wealth consumed as the uncertainty grows if g
￿ 1) go through in this case.
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